United States v. Newman: Misappropriation of Market Information by Outsiders by Robertson, James M.
Pace Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 2 Winter 1983 Article 5
January 1983
United States v. Newman: Misappropriation of
Market Information by Outsiders
James M. Robertson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
James M. Robertson, United States v. Newman: Misappropriation of Market Information by Outsiders , 3
Pace L. Rev. 311 (1983)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/5
United States v. Newman:
Misappropriation of Market Information
by Outsiders
I. Introduction
In United States v. Newman,1 the majority of a three-judge
panel held that an outsider' who trades securities based upon
material nonpublic market information s that is misappropriated
from someone with whom he had a relationship of trust and con-
fidence violates section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,4
1. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'g United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I] 98,024 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981).
2. Outsiders, as opposed to insiders, see infra note 52, and tippees, see infra note
60, have no connections whatsoever to the company whose stock they are trading in.
3. Market information refers to events occuring outside a company, such as a tender
offer, which will have an effect on the price of its securities. See Brudney, Insiders, Out-
siders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HAav. L.
REV. 322, 329-30 (1979); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the
Responsibility To Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 799 (1973). In-
side information, on the other hand, emanates from within the company and concerns
facts about its assets and earning power, such as a new research breakthrough or re-
source discovery. Id.
4. Section 10(b) provides in relevant part
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may proscribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Since the language of
section 10(b) was not self-effectuating, but required Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) rules to enforce it, Rule 10b-5 was promulgated, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
1
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even though the fraud was not against a purchaser or seller.' Li-
ability for outsider trading had been addressed by the Supreme
Court one year earlier in Chiarella v. United States.' That case
held that an outsider had no duty to disclose his informational
advantage to an ordinary seller in the marketplace because there
was no fiduciary relationship between the parties that would cre-
ate a duty to speak.' The Court, however, failed to rule on the
government's alternative theory, which based liability upon the
defendant's fraudulent misappropriation of material nonpublic
information from his employer and its clients.8 It is this theory
that was approved in the Newman decision9 and its importance
lies in the fact that it now provides the government with a
means to control abusive trading practices by outsiders.
The fraud in Newman stems from the activities of employ-
ees of two investment banking firms which plan takeover bids
for offering companies. 10 According to the government, the em-
ployees surreptitiously passed confidential information about
the identities of the "target" companies desired by the offerors
to accomplices outside their firms. One of these coconspirators
was James Mitchell Newman, who was in charge of over the
counter trading at another firm. Together with two European
cohorts, Newman bought securities in the proposed "targets"
and sold them at a profit when the merger plans were made pub-
lic. The proceeds were then split with the employees who sup-
plied the information. To avoid discovery of their activities, the
transactions were made using, among other devices, offshore
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). For a comprehensive review of the law that has developed
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, see generally A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECUR-
ITIES FRAUD AND COMMODImEs FRAUD (1982); A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5
(1980).
5. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
6. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See infra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
7. Id. at 235.
8. Id. at 235-36. The Court found that this argument was not presented squarely to
the jury. Id. at 236. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
9. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15-16.
10. Id. at 15. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are derived from the court of
appeals opinion.
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bank accounts and coded communications." Eventually, federal
authorities did detect this activity and the participants were
charged with criminal violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5,12 the Mail Fraud Statute,"3 and the Anti-Conspiracy Statute.1
Most of those charged fled the country to avoid prosecution, 5
while one pleaded guilty,'" leaving Newman as the only defen-
dant in this case.
The district court dismissed the government's indictment
on the basis of a finding that this area of the securities law was
so unsettled at the time of the defendant's activities that it did
not give him "fair notice" that such conduct was illegal.17 The
lower court also ruled that the securities laws were not intended
to reach fraud other than that committed against a purchaser or
seller.' 8
The majority of a Second Circuit panel reversed the district
court by holding that the scope of section 10(b) is not limited to
fraud in the purchase-sale transaction.' 9 Rather, it includes
11. Id. The other devices used in this scheme included: not using their names on
account statements; keeping the coconspirators identities a secret from each other; pay-
ing for their trades with cash, treasury bills, or bearer bonds; avoiding contact with the
two employees who supplied the information; and if necessary, lying if the government
inquired about their trading. See Brief for the United States of America at 6, United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
12. Under section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(1976), criminal prosecutions can be brought for violations of section 10(b) or Rule lOb-
5, with penalties of fines ranging up to $10,000, prison terms of up to five years, or both.
The only other judicial remedy expressly included in the law is section 21(d), 15 U.S.C. §
78u(d) (1976), which gives the SEC the power to seek injunctive relief against violations
of the statute or the Rule.
For a description of the various administrative remedies that can be brought by the
Commission, see generally Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative Remedies Available to
the SEC for Breaches of Rule 10b-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 397, 422-34 (1979).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
This casenote will only be discussing the securities law issues in Newman. As for the
two other counts, the district court dismissed both, United States v. Courtois, [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,301, and the Second Circuit
unanimously reinstated them, United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 20-21.
15. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V
98,024, at 91,287 n. 1.
16. S.E.C. Digest, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
17. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. S-C. L. RaP. (CCH) 1
98,024, at 91,296.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
1983]
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fraudulent conduct whose sole purpose is to put a person in a
position to buy and sell securities. 0 Further, the court held that
when the scope of the law is properly understood, the broad lan-
guage of Rule 10b-5, by itself, should have given Newman suffi-
cient notice that his actions were prohibited.2"
This casenote will examine the two questions of law raised
by the Newman decision: whether fraud against employers and
their clients comes within the scope of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 and whether the defendant had "fair notice," consistent
with due process, that his conduct was unlawful. To provide an
adequate background for examining these issues, this note will
review the development of the law regarding fraudulent nondis-
closure in securities transactions from the common law through
the Chiarella opinion. Next, it will present the opinions of both
the district court and the court of appeals. The analysis section
will compare and critically examine both decisions leading to the
conclusion that the majority opinion of the Second Circuit panel
correctly reflects the law regarding both the scope of Rule 10b-5
and the notice that the defendant was required to receive.
II. The Development of Nondisclosure Liability in the
Context of Securities Transactions
A. The Common Law
Under common law principles of fraud, a party to a securi-
ties transaction, as in any business deal, has no obligation to re-
veal material information concerning that transaction of which
the other party is not aware.22 In ordinary "arms-length" com-
mercial dealings, this rule is intended to promote diligence and
shrewdness.23 However, when a relationship of trust and confi-
dence exists between the parties, such as between a principal
and agent, a strict disclosure duty is imposed.2
20. Id. at 17-18.
21. Id. at 19.
22. W. PRosSE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 695-96 (4th ed. 1971).
See Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 COR-
NL! L.Q. 53, 56-57 (1960); Note, Civil Liability Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REV.
537, 552-53 (1956).
23. See, e.g., Conant, supra note 22, at 56-57.
24. Psossm, supra note 22, at 696-97; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)
& comment a (1977). See Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L.
[Vol. 3:311
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Eventually, state courts applied these general common law
rules to specific problems arising from the trading of corporate
securities. 5 One critical issue that developed concerned the dis-
closure duty of corporate directors, officers, and majority share-
holders when they traded with ordinary shareholders on the ba-
sis of material nonpublic information that they obtained
through their positions."6
Initially, the majority of courts held that these company in-
siders owed their allegiance solely to the corporation and thus
had no disclosure obligation before buying or selling from a
shareholder. The minority view regarded these insiders as
trustees of the company's shareholders," and imposed a duty to
disclose under the common law of fraud.2' Between these two
extremes, a number of courts that followed the majority rule rec-
ognized a limited obligation to speak that required insiders to
reveal the occurrence of certain special facts about the company
which would make the trade with the unknowing shareholder
too unfair to enforce.80
B. Rule 10b-5 and the Judicial Expansion of Fraud-
ulent Nondisclosure
Soon after the collapse of the stock market in 1929, Con-
gress decided to restore public confidences' by regulating the
Rzv. 1, 11 (1936).
25. See, e.g., Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N.J.L. 656, 657, 23 A. 426, 427 (1891); Roth-
miller v. Stein, 143 N.Y. 581, 591-92, 38 N.E. 718, 719-20 (1894).
26. W. FLgrCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1167 (rev. ed.
1975).
27. See, e.g., Clayton v. James B. Clow & Sons, 212 F. Supp. 482, 583 (N.D. IlL
1962); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (1933). Under the majority
rule, it is assumed that the shareholder can achieve the same results as through disclo-
sure, by inspecting the corporation's books, which are open to them. See FLRrcHm,
supra note 26, at § 1168.1.
28. See, e.g., King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 216 Ga. 581, 118 S.E.2d 581, 584-85 (1961);
Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232, 233-34 (1903). Under the minority rule it did
not matter if the shareholder could get the necessary information by inspecting the com-
pany's books, since the insiders were held to have a fiduciary duty to disclose all relevant
facts in a transaction with them. See FLETCHER, supra note 26, at § 1168.2.
29. See supra note 24.
30. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431-34 (1909); Agatucci v. Conadi, 327
Ill. App. 153, 157-58, 63 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1945); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 508,
202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925).
31. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775-76 (1979) (quoting S. RaP. No. 47,
1983]
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securities industry through the passage of two major pieces of
legislation - the Securities Act of 193332 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.-3 Besides the protection of investors, a ma-
jor goal of these laws was to restore integrity to the market-
place. " In order to create a sense of fair dealing, Congress also
sought to promote relationships of trust and confidence in the
industry.3
Among the provisions of the Exchange Act, section 10(b)
contained a sweeping prohibition against fraud and gave the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to make
rules to enforce it.26 In 1942, the SEC enacted Rule 10b-5 7
which made it unlawful for "any person" to use "any device" or
73d Cong., 1st Seas. 1 (1933)). See H.R. Rap. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Seas. 2 (1933). In a
letter in support of the 1933 Act, President Roosevelt stated that its purpose was to
create "honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence." Id. See
generally 1 L. Loss, SEcuRrrs REGULATION 119-21 (2d ed. 1961).
32. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). This Act focuses on disclosure by the issuer concern-
ing the company and its securities prior to their initial sale.
33. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The general thrust of this Act is the
regulation of trading after the initial issuance of the securities.
Other important legislation passed by Congress in this area includes: The Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 41,
53 Stat. 1149 (1939) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)); The Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (current ver-
sion at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); and The Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to
80b-21 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
34. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 775-76. See also 78 CONG. REc. 7697
(1934). In considering the passage of the Exchange Act, Representative Rayburn stressed
the goal of integrity when he stated: "[w]e should have a marketplace for the exchange of
securities, but it should be a clean and honest marketplace." Id.
35. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971)
(quoting H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934)). See also H.R. R.P. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Seas. 5 (1934) which states:
If investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of exchanges and corpo-
rations alike, the law must advance .... Unless constant extension of the legal
conception of a fiduciary relationship - a guarantee of "straight shooting" -
supports a maturing and complicated economic system, easy liquidation of re-
sources in which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a prop to the stability
of the system.
Id.
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/5
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make "any untrue statement" or "engage in any act" that de-
frauds "any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security."8
It is generally accepted that Congress intended the broad
terms of section 10(b) to act as a "catch-all" to deal with new
kinds of fraud as they arose.39 Yet, the language of neither the
section nor the Rule expressly addresses the subject of nondis-
closure.40 Also, the brief legislative history offers very few clues
as to Congressional intent on this subject.41
The courts initially treated the Rule as a mere codification
of the common law rules of disclosure for corporate insiders.42
The first indication that Rule 10b-5 imposed a broader disclo-
sure duty came from the SEC in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.43
This administrative decision held that a broker-dealer violated
the Rule by purchasing stock based on information supplied by
a partner in his firm who also happened to be a director in the
company whose stock he bought.44 The SEC extended the direc-
tor's disclosure obligation to the broker-dealer on the basis of
this "access" test:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a cor-
porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202, 206 (1976). Accord Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. at 226. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on Stock
Exchange Regulation Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934). Thomas Corcoran, representing the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration, described the purpose of what was then called section 9(c) (later codified as
section 10(b)), when he said:
Subsection (c) says, "Thou shall not devise any other cunning devices." Of
course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not
think there is any objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should have
the authority to deal with new manipulative devices.
Id.
40. See supra note 4 for the text of the statute and the rule.
41. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 226. See 5 A. JAcos, supra note 4, § 6.01.
42. E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 801-02 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(officers and directors held liable); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373,
380-81 (1943) (officers who were also majority shareholders held liable). See also Jen-
nings, Insider Trading of Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure
Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. Rav. 809, 814-15 (1968).
43. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
44. Id. at 913.
1983]
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second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes ad-
vantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.45
Definitive judicial recognition of Rule 10b-5's broader scope
came when the Second Circuit decided SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.' 6 In this case, the defendants included not only the
corporation's directors and officers but also its employees who
were accused of buying their company's securities without dis-
closing their knowledge of a significant mineral discovery by the
corporation. 7 According to the court, the employees were also
liable for trading without disclosure because Rule 10b-5 requires
that:
[a]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public or if he is disabled from disclos-
ing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not
to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the se-
curities concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed. 4O
By finding that "anyone" who holds inside information has
the same liability that used to be reserved for directors, officers
and majority shareholders, the Second Circuit paved the way for
other courts to create a whole list of non-traditional insiders.
For example, underwriters of corporate securities issues,4
outside attorneys,50 and accountants 1 who have obtained mate-
rial nonpublic information while working for the corporation are
among those held to have a duty to disclose or abstain from
45. Id. at 912.
46. 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Prior to Texas Gulf, some district courts did, however, look to
the Cady, Roberts access test for guidance on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.,
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
47. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 843-48.
48. Id. at 848.
49. E.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239
(2d Cir. 1974).
50. E.g., United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
955 (1971).
51. E.g., Herzfelt v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112,
121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
[Vol. 3:311
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trading. 52
In addition to its creation of the "abstain or disclose" rule,
Texas Gulf added a new gloss to the Cady, Roberts "access"
test. While recognizing that the Cady, Roberts formula is the es-
sence of Rule 10b-5, the court restated it so that the portion
referring to the existence of some "relationship" to the company
was dropped.6" This construction was consistent with the entire
tone of the opinion which stressed the unfairness of trading on
information which one knows is unavailable to the other party in
the transaction. 54
The next expansion of Rule 10b-5 imposed an "abstain or
disclose" duty on persons outside the corporation who trade on
information tipped to them from sources inside the company. In
Texas Gulf, the court held that the 'insider was liable for the
trading of his tippee,a but it never decided whether the tippee
also violated the Rule because none were named as defendants
52. With the addition of so many other classes to the list of traditional insiders, it is
necessary to have a definition based on their common characteristics. One commentator
has suggested that "[a]n insider is a person who: (1) possesses inside information; (2)
knows or should know the information is nonpublic; and (3) receives the information in
his business capacity and for a legitimate business reason by virtue of a relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to the information." See 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 4, §
66.02[a), at 3-327.
53. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848. According to the court in
Texas Gulf, the main point of Cady, Roberts was that-
anyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a corporation has
"access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone" may not take "ad-
vantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing," i.e. the investing public.
Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912). Compare the above language
with what the SEC said in Cady, Roberts, supra note 45 and accompanying text. In
Cady, Roberts, the SEC determined that, under Rule 10b-5, "[the Commission's] task
... is to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and
privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securi-
ties." 40 S.E.C. at 912 (emphasis added).
54. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848, 851-52. Under Texas Gulf's
analysis, "Rule [10b-5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities
marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal ac-
cess to material information." Id. at 848, accord Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 n.13 (2d Cir. 1974).
55. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 843, 856 n.23. Defendant Coates, a
director of Texas Gulf, was held liable for trading that resulted from a tip to his son-in-
law, a broker, who in turn recommended the stock to his customers. Id.
9
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:311
in that case." The first judicial decision to establish tippee lia-
bility was Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith.57
In Shapiro, while acting as the managing underwriter for a pro-
posed debenture offer by Douglas Aircraft, Merrill Lynch
learned that Douglas was about to announce sharply lower earn-
ings estimates than it had previously predicted.58  Before this
news was made public, Merrill Lynch tipped it to certain pre-
ferred customers who in turn sold their holdings." The Second
Circuit held that the tippees in this case violated Rule 10b-5 be-
cause they knew or should have known that their information
came from within the corporation and that this was not public
knowledge.60
C. The Supreme Court and Rule 10b-5
1. Expansion of scope
Up to the time that the Second Circuit decided the Shapiro
case, the Supreme Court had interpreted Rule 10b-5 and other
securities legislation liberally." For example, in Superintendent
56. Id. at 852-53.
57. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). A number of courts had already accepted the con-
cept of tippee liability, but liability was still based on some insider duty. See, e.g., Radia-
tion Dynamics v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887, 890 (2d Cir. 1972); Ross v. Licht, 263 F.
Supp. 395, 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Furthermore, the SEC had already established tip-
pee liability in its administrative cases. See, e.g., In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 254-
55 (1973); In re Investors Mgm't Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 639-41 (1971). Also, while Cady,
Roberts did not use the term tippee in describing the broker-dealer in that case, it im-
posed liability for that kind of behavior. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
58. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d at 231-32.
59. Id. at 232. These tippee-clients of Merrill Lynch sold or sold short over 165,000
shares causing Douglas stock to drop sharply. Id. at 232-33.
60. Id. at 237-38. In order to distinguish between insiders and tippees, the following
definition is helpful :
A tippee is a person who: (1) possesses inside information; (2) knows or
should know the information is nonpublic; (3) received the information other than
in his business capacity and for a legitimate business reason; and (4) knows or
should know the information "had been obtained improperly by selective revela-
tion or otherwise."
5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 4, § 66.02[a], at 3-328.
61. See infra notes 62-71. See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-38
(1967) (a withdrawable capital share comes under the definition of a "security" in section
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976), because
this is remedial legislation and should be construed broadly); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 430-31 (1967) (creating an implied cause of action for proxy fraud under sec-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/5
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of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 62 the Court held
that the "in connection with" clause of Rule 10b-5 should be
construed "flexibly" to reach fraud "touching" on a securities
transaction." To support its position, the Court pointed to the
language of section 10(b) which repeatedly uses the word "any"
in describing the type of fraudulent conduct, the security, and
the person which must be connected to the purchase or sale of
securities." It also referred to the legislative history of the Se-
curities Exchange Act to show that Congress found that it was
essential that the SEC have "broad discretionary powers" in
pursuing fraud. 5
Only a year later, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States," the Court further expanded the scope of Rule 10b-5
when it held that bank employees, acting as market makers for
Ute tribe members who wished to sell their tribal stock, had an
obligation to disclose that they were reselling the shares at a
higher price in the market outside the tribe."7 Since the undis-
closed information concerned the market characteristics of the
stock and not inside information about the corporation, liability
could not be established under existing insider theories.6 8 As in
Bankers Life, the Court stressed the frequent use of the word
tion 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 188-95 (1963) (holding that intent was not
required to violate section 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80b-6 (1976)).
62. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). In this case, the defendant purchased the stock of an insur-
ance company through a scheme in which he paid for the cost of the acquisition by
selling the company's assets. The plaintiff, a liquidator of the now broke corporation,
sued the defendant for damages under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 6-8. Both the district court,
300 F. Supp. 1083, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), and the court of appeals, 430 F.2d 355, 360 (2d
Cir. 1970), dismissed the case, holding that this conduct was not within the scope of the
federal securities laws but was rather a common law action for misappropriation.
63. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. at 12-13.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id. at 11-12 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934)). In a
footnote, the Court also quoted with approval the Second Circuit's conclusion in A.T.
Brod v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967), that "Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase of sale of securities,
whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a
unique form of deception." Id. at 11 n.7.
66. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
67. Id. at 152-53.
68. See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
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"any" in both the section and the Rule as supporting a liberal
construction of their scope.69 Also, the Court repeated its belief
that it previously made in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau0 that the underlying purpose of the securities laws "was to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry. 7 1
2. Restriction of scope
Beginning in 1975 with its decision in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,7 2 the Supreme Court began to apply a de-
cidedly more restrictive and rigid analysis to section 10(b) and
other areas of the securities laws.7 In Blue Chip, the Court
adopted the "purchaser-seller" standing rule for private damage
suits74 brought under Rule 10b-. 75 This restriction was first set
forth about twenty-five years earlier by the Second Circuit in
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.7
69. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 151.
70. 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
71. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186).
72. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
73. Id. at 731-55. See L. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under The
Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L. J. 891, 892-900 (1977); Note,
The Trend Toward A Strict Construction of Rule 10b-5: Aaron v. SEC and Chiarella, 13
CONN. L. REv. 549, 554-62 (1981).
74. The private right of action for damages was first implied from Rule 10b-5 in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Twenty-five years
later, the Supreme Court finally recognized this remedy in Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. at 13 n. 9.
75. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 749.
76. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). In Birnbaum, the
Second Circuit held that a corporation's decision to call off a merger does not give its
shareholders standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 because they were neither defrauded pur-
chasers nor sellers. Id. at 464. Most federal courts followed Birnbaum in determining
standing in private damages actions under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc.,
492 F.2d 750, 763 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341
(9th Cir. 1972).
Over time, a major exception to this rule developed in which a number of circuits
held that private plaintiffs seeking only injunctive relief did not have to be buyers or
sellers. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797-98 (2d Cir.
1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967); Kahan
v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Britt v. Cyril
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The Birnbaum holding was based on an analysis of the
scope of section 10(b) which concluded that it "was directed
solely at the type of misrepresentation usually associated with
the sale or purchase of securities . . . ,,7 In contrast, Blue
Chip focused its analysis on a search for the legislative intent
behind granting private remedies under the securities laws. 78 For
example, the Court pointed out that whenever Congress did
grant such a privilege in the securities laws it was usually lim-
ited to purchasers or sellers. 9
Unlike Birnbaum, Blue Chip further justified the imposi-
tion of the standing rule because of important policy problems
resulting from the explosive growth of the implied private ac-
tion.80 The Court feared that, without the documentary evi-
dence of a purchase-sale transaction, suits based on oral testi-
mony, which would not be amenable to dispositive motions,
might swamp the courts.8 It also argued that abuse of oral testi-
mony could be a particular danger in this kind of litigation and
might lead to vexatious and frivolous suits.8 2 Further, opening
up the class of potential plaintiffs posed the problem of suits
brought solely to harass by parties with little chance of winning
on the merits.83 According to the Court, a standing rule would
Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1969). The theory behind this exception was best
stated by Judge Feinberg-
[Tihe claim for damages ... founders both on proof of loss and causal connection
with the alleged violation of the Rule; on the other hand, the claim for injunctive
relief largely avoids these issues, may cure harm suffered to continuing sharehold-
ers, and would afford complete relief against Rule 10b-5 violations for the future.
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d at 547.
77. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d at 464 (emphasis added).
78. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 729-31.
79. Id. at 735-36 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 78i, 78r (1976)).
The Court in Blue Chip also noted that Congress rejected a proposal by the SEC to
add the phrase "or any attempt to purchase or sell any security" to section 10(b). Id. at
732 (citing 103 CONG. Rzc. 11636 (1957) (emphasis added)). It construed this as evi-
dence of a Congressional intent that only purchasers or sellers be able to utilize a private
cause of action, because of fears of "the extension of civil liability under § 10(b)." Id. at
732. (citing SEC Legislation, Hearings on S. 1178-1182 before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1959)).
80. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 737.
81. Id. at 742-43.
82. Id. at 743.
83. Id. at 740-41. According to the Court, "strike suits" of this kind are brought not
only to harass but also because the defendant may often settle even where the plaintiff
has little chance of winning at trial. This is because great cost and disruption to the
19831
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control these problems by restricting potential "plaintiffs to
those who have at least dealt in the security."8
One year after Blue Chip, the Supreme Court again limited
Rule 10b-5 in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder85 by holding that one
cannot commit fraud under the Rule without "scienter." 86 Look-
ing at the language of section 10(b), the Court found that the
words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" provided a
clear indication that Congress intended to proscribe willful, as
opposed to negligent, conduct.8 7 The Court noted that whenever
Congress created civil liability for negligence in the securities
laws, it did so explicitly.88
The following year, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,9
the Court, again focusing on the language of section 10(b), held
that absent "manipulation" or "deception," the mere breach of a
fiduciary duty does not by itself violate the law. 0 Under a
broader interpretation, the Court argued, there was the danger
of turning ordinary corporate mismanagement into a violation of
the federal securities laws.9
These three cases exemplify a trend by the Supreme Court
retreating from earlier decisions that stressed the need to "flexi-
bly"92 interpret section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, toward a more
rigid and literal construction of the broad terms contained in
both.93 In making these strict interpretations, however, the
Court has emphasized practical policy reasons such as limiting
defendant's business is possible in meeting the massive discovery requests available to
the plaintiff under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)
("parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action ...... (emphasis added)).
84. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 747.
85. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
86. Id. at 193. The Court defined "scienter" as "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at 193-94 n. 12.
87. Id. at 199.
88. Id. at 207-08.
89. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
90. Id. at 473-74.
91. Id. at 47 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. at
12). The Court stressed that since corporations are creatures of state law, it is that law
which properly governs their internal operations. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
at 479.
92. See supra text accompanying note 63.
93. This trend can also be seen in the Court's restrictive interpretation of other sec-
tions of the securities laws. See infra note 207.
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the growth of private actions,94 preventing vexatious litigation,95
and drawing a line between internal corporate mismanagement
and securities fraud.9
6
D. Chiarella v. United States: Nondisclosure of Market Infor-
mation by an Outsider
It was in this restrictive atmosphere that the government
began to depart from the familiar landmarks of insider trading
by applying Rule 10b-5 to persons outside the corporation who
trade upon material nonpublic information generated in the
marketplace.97 The first of these cases to reach the Supreme
Court was Chiarella v. United States. 8
In Chiarella, the defendant worked for a financial printer
that prepared materials for the bidding companies in tender of-
fers.99 While the items that Chiarella handled deliberately did
not identify either the offeror or the target company, to prevent
employees from misusing the information, the defendant was
able to deduce some of the identities from the information avail-
able to him.100 Using this knowledge, Chiarella bought stock in
these takeover candidates and then sold it at a profit after the
public announcement of the offer drove up the price.101 When
this scheme was discovered by the SEC, Chiarella entered into a
civil consent decree to stop his trading and to disgorge his prof-
its.102 He was subsequently indicted for criminally violating sec-
tion 10(b).10 3
Since the defendant was neither an insider of the corpora-
94. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. at 478-79.
96. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., SEC v. Manderano [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,357 (D.N.J. 1978); SEC v. Primar Typographers, Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,734 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Sorg Printing Co. [1974-75 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,767 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) and FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,034.
98. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
99. Id. at 224.
100. Id.
101. Id. By his trading, Chiarella made a little more than $30,000. Id.
102. SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. Action No. 2534 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1977).
103. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 225.
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tion whose stock he traded, nor a tippee of an inside source, he
did not fit within the liability formulas developed in previous
Rule 10b-5 cases.""4 The majority of a Second Circuit panel had
no trouble finding that prior Rule 10b-5 cases covered Chiarel-
la's conduct.1 0 5 The court argued that the Texas Gulf decision
stressed that the underlying policy of Rule 10b-5 is "the justi-
fiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information."106 It further contended that the market
cannot operate efficiently when people are allowed to personally
profit by exploiting information they obtain from their "stra-
tegic places in the market mechanism."' 0 7 Under this theory, the
main reason for prohibiting corporate insiders from using inside
information is that it gives them an unfair edge in trading with
those who are unaware of such facts. Since one of the principal
purposes of the securities laws was to ensure the "integrity of
the marketplace,"' 0 8 the majority concluded that the "abstain or
disclosure" rule applied to "[a]nyone - corporate insider or not
- who regularly receives material nonpublic information. "109
The dissent'" argued that no case had ever held an outsider
liable for trading on market information and that to do so in
this case would rewrite the law."' It also noted that section
10(b) proscribes fraud and that under the common law, nondis-
closure does not become fraud unless there is a duty to speak." 2
Since Chiarella had no relationship to those who sold stock to
him, the dissent contended that there was no disclosure obliga-
104. See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
105. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364-65 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980).
106. Id. at 1365 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848)).
107. Id. at 1365.
108. Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1977)). The
majority pointed out that section 10(b) was designed to restore confidence in the market
by proscribing "those maniuplative and deceptive practices which have been demon-
strated to fulfill no useful function." Id. at 1369 (citing S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., at 6 (1934)). According to the majority, Chiarella's conduct fit this description.
Id.
109. Id. at 1365.
110. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1375 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (citing PROSSER, supra note 22, § 106).
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tion.113 While recognizing that the defendant did owe the offer-
ing companies a duty not to misuse secrets put in his trust, 1 4 it
quoted the Santa Fe case for the proposition that "the term
'fraud' in Rule 10b-5 does not bring within the ambit of the rule
'all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities
transaction.' ,,11
The dissent also emphasized that this was a criminal case
which required that the government prove that the law gave the
defendant "fair notice" that his conduct was illegal."' Noting
that the standard for criminal prosecution under section 10(b) is
"a clear and definite statement of the conduct proscribed, '" 7
the dissent argued that no such statement existed in the section,
the case law, or in "established custom and usage.""'
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected the Second Cir-
cuit majority's conclusion and held that an unfair informational
advantage by itself does not violate Rule 10b-5." 9 The Court
stressed that situations involving financial unfairness are not al-
ways fraud. 20 Paralleling the Second Circuit dissent, the Court
relied on the boundaries of traditional common law fraud to
conclude that Rule 10b-5 does not create a disclosure obligation
without some preexisting fiduciary duty or other relationship of
113. Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
114. While Chiarella's primary agency relationship was within his employer, see in-
fra note 123 he was also a subagent of his employer's clients and owed them the same
duties owed his employer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 428 & comment b
(1954).
115. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1375 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 473)).
116. Id. at 1376-78 (Meskill, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has held that a law
is unconstitutionally vague when it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." United States v. Har-
riss, 347 U.S. 612, 667 (1954) (emphasis added), accord Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
117. United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 288 (2d Cir. 1975). In Persky, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are not unconstitutionally vague
on their face. Rather, the court found that these laws give a clear warning that "conduct
fraudulent even under the most restrictive definition of the common law . . . is pro-
scribed ...... Id.
118. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1377 (Meskill, J., dissenting). While the
government presented a number of actions brought against outsiders as precedent, see
supra note 97, the dissent argued that they all resulted in consent decrees or guilty pleas
and did not provide sufficient notice. Id. at 1377 n. 6 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
119. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230, 235 (1980).
120. Id. at 232.
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trust and confidence.1 21 Since Chiarella was a stranger to the
sellers in the transactions in question, the Court held that he
owed them no duty to speak. 22
This decision did not, however, entirely foreclose the possi-
bility of using Rule 10b-5 in similar cases. The Court expressly
left open the question of whether Chiarella's breach of his
fiduciary duty to his employer and its clients would give rise to a
violation of the Rule.' 23 This alternative theory of liability was
not considered by the Court because it found that it had not
been presented squarely to the jury. 24
The concurring and dissenting opinions, however, did dis-
cuss this theory. While agreeing that the jury was not properly
charged, Justice Brennan believed that a duty to disclose is cre-
ated under Rule 10b-5 when one "improperly obtains or con-
verts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then
uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 12 5
Justice Stevens' concurrence found that reasonable arguments
could be made for or against this theory. 26 Chief Justice Bur-
ger's dissent argued that the common law's purpose for denying
a disclosure duty in arms-length business dealings - i.e., re-
warding business acumen, hard work, and skill - are not pro-
moted "when an informational advantage is obtained, not by su-
perior experience, foresight or industry, but by some unlawful
means."1 7 The Chief Justice also contended that the repeated
use of the word "any" in the statute indicated that Congress in-
tended to reach more than just fraud by insiders. 28
121. Id. at 227-28. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 235.
123. Chiarella, as an agent of his employer, had a relationship of trust and confi-
dence, which gave rise to a duty not to disclose or use, for either his own personal profit
or to harm his employer, any confidential information given to him in his job. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387, 395 & comments a and c (1954). This relationship, in
turn, gave rise to a disclosure duty under the common law of fraud. See supra note 26.
124. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 236.
125. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., concurring). The negative argument rested on the
fact that the defrauded party was not a purchaser or seller of securities. Since that party
did not have standing to sue under the "purchaser-seller" rule, there was arguably no
violation of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 240-41 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This analysis parallels that of earlier
more liberal interpretations of Rule 10b-5 by the Court. See supra notes 64 & 69 and
[Vol. 3:311
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/5
1983] OUTSIDERS & RULE 10b-5
After Chiarella, the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3, which ex-
pressly proscribes both insider and outsider trading in the con-
text of corporate tender offers.129 Because the language of sec-
tion 14(e),13° the statute upon which the Rule is based, contains
words that almost parallel section 10(b), 31 some critics argue
that Chiarella's interpretation of what constitutes fraud under
the securities laws similarly restricts Rule 14e-3.1 3 2 In the an-
nouncement accompanying the promulgation of the new Rule,
the SEC disagreed with this construction.133 It also stated its in-
accompanying text.
Justices Blackmun and Marshall never discussed this alternative theory because
they agreed with the majority of the Second Circuit that an unlawful informational ad-
vantage violates Rule 10b-5. Id. at 245-52 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
129. Rule 14e-3 provides in relevant part:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has com-
menced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of
the Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating
to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpub-
lic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indi-
rectly from (1) the offering person, (2) the issuer of the securities sought or to be
sought by such tender offer, or (3) any officer, director, partner, or employee or
any person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or
sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities
convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to
obtain or to dispose of any of the foreign securities, unless within a reasonable
time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly
disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1982).
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) provides in
relevant part that it shall be unlawful to make "any untrue statement of material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive or manip-
ulative acts or practices, in connection with a tender offer ...... Id.
131. Compare supra note 129 (section 14(e)) with supra note 4 (section 10(b)).
132. See H. Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" Versus Eco-
nomic Theory, 37 Bus. LAw. 517, 541-43 (1982): D. Block & H. Prussin, "Outsider" Du-
ties In Insider Trading, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 19, 21, col. 3.
133. See Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 34-17,120 (Sept. 12, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410,
60,412 & n.20. In its release, the Commission stated:
[tihe Chiarella Court did not resolve whether trading while in possession of ma-
terial, nonpublic market information misappropriated or obtained or used by un-
lawful means violates Rule lob-5. The Commission continues to believe that such
conduct undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, the securities
markets, and that persons who unlawfully obtain and misappropriate material,
nonpublic information violate Rule 10b-5 when they trade on such information.
19
PACE LAW REVIEW
tention to use the alternative theory in Chiarella to reach out-
sider trading with Rule 10b-5.134
III. United States v. Newman: Differing Views of the
Misappropriation Theory
In 1981, the Newman case presented an opportunity to test
the government's alternative theory in Chiarella. The facts of
Newman closely parallel Chiarella in that both involve the mis-
appropriation by an employee of confidential market informa-
tion about an acquiring company's plans to make a tender
offer.
13 5
A. The Opinion of the District Court: Focus on Fair Notice
While acknowledging that "the question left open in
Chiarella" was "squarely presented" before it,"'e the district
court approached its analysis of Rule 10b-5 indirectly. Like the
dissent to the Second Circuit's Chiarella opinion, the district
court focuses on the fact that this was a criminal prosecution
which required proof of a "clear and definite statement of the
conduct proscribed" antedating Newman's conduct.1 37 For this
reason, the district court's analysis focused on whether the Ex-
change Act, the Commission's rules and the judicial decisions in-
terpreting this body of law gave the defendant fair notice that
trading on misappropriated market information was illegal. 138
In answer to its question, the lower court held that until
1980, when the SEC explictly proscribed the abuse of market
information in tender offers through Rule 14e-3,139 this area of
the law was so unsettled that Newman could not have received
Moreover, the decision did not suggest any limitation on the Commission's au-
thority under Section 14(e) to adopt a rule regulating trading while in possession
of material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer.
Id. at 60,412.
134. Id.
135. Compare supra text accompanying notes 10-11 with supra text accompanying
notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
136. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
98,024, at 91,290.
137. Id. at 91,289 (quoting United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d at 287)).
138. Id. at 91,290.
139. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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the requisite notice. "1 0 Three reasons were given for this conclu-
sion. First, it argued that the failure of the Commission to ap-
ply Rule 10b-5 to "warehousing," where the offeror intentionally
leaks its plan to certain institutional traders,14 1 indicated that
persons unrelated to the target company can freely trade on
market information. 14 This is because, the court argued, the
principal reason for not applying Rule 10b-5 to "warehousing"
was the offeror's lack of relationship to the target.143 Since New-
man also had no connection to the target, the district court con-
tended that the defendant could have only concluded that his
conduct was also not proscribed. " '
The second reason advanced by the court was that during
the development of Rule 14e-3, with only one exception,14 5 the
SEC's proposals for the Rule failed to mention any role for Rule
10b-5 in controlling outsider trading. 4 6 While the government
140. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at
91,296.
141. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into The Responsibil-
ity To Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 811-12 (1973). According to
the authors, the offeror's purposes for tipping certain institutional investors include:
maintaining the price of the target stock during the time of the offer by creating institu-
tional interest; and financing the takeover by, for example, prompting institutions to
take a position in the target company's stock under the assumption that they will tender
their shares when the bid is made public. Id. at 812 (citing SEC, Institutional Investor
Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2828-29, 2836 & 2847 (1971)).
142. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at
91,293.
143. Id. (quoting [Summary Volume] SEC, Institutional Investor Study Report,
supra note 141, at XXII-IIl). To support its position, the court quoted extensively from
this Commission report and included this passage:
With respect, however, to passing on information about a prospective takeover
effort to favored institutions, the persons who do so usually are the persons who
plan the takeovers and ordinarily have no relationship to the target company, nor
do they have any fiduciary duty to that company or its shareholders. This differ-
ence in relationships does not necessarily mean that such passing on of informa-
tion concerning takeovers should be permitted, but it may well mean that if such
activities are to be prohibitted, this should be done by a rule specifically directed
to that situation rather than by expanded interpretation of Rule 10 b-5 resting
on a somewhat different theory than that underlying that rule as to the obliga-
tions and duties of those who receive material undisclosed information.
Id. (emphasis is court's).
144. Id.
145. SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 34-15,548 (Sept. 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 9,956, at
9,977.
146. See United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
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did bring a number of actions against outsiders during this same
period,147 the lower court discounted this fact."'8 As in the
Chiarella dissent, the Newman court noted that these cases con-
sisted of unlitigated guilty pleas and consent decrees which do
not provide clear notice because they can be "entered into by
parties who may want to avoid litigation for any number of
reasons."
1 49
The last factor given to support the district court's conclu-
sion was that prior to and during the defendant's participation
in this scheme, the courts had only applied Rule 10b-5 to non-
disclosure by insiders and tippees who had a connection to the
company whose stock they traded in, but never to outsiders
trading on market information. 5 ' The court also noted that past
"misappropriation" cases only concerned the theft of securities
or their proceeds but not information. 151 Since these employees
only breached their "duty of loyalty and ethical behavior" and
did not affect the bankers' or offerors' ability to invest in the
target corporations, the district court argued that this was not a
federal crime but rather belonged in the domain of state law.1 52
In its final statements, the district court provided a key rea-
son for its conclusion. Citing Chiarella,153 Texas Gulf, 54 and
at 91,294 & n.16.
147. See supra note 97.
148. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder], FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at
91,294-95.
149. Id. at 91,295 (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1377 n.6 (Meskill,
J., dissenting)). See supra note 118.
150. Id. But see Zweig v. Hearst Corp. 594 F.2d 1261, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1979). In
Zweig, a financial columnist wrote a positive article about a stock that he had purchased.
Instead of basing liability on an insider theory, the court held that his failure to disclose
his conflict of interest to his readers was unlawful. See also SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
151. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at
91,295-96 (citing United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1977); A.T. Brod &
Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 1967); Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 397 F.2d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 1968)).
152. Id. at 91,296.
153. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 230. The portion of the opinion to which
the Newman court was apparently referring states:
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud ac-
tionable under § 10(b) despite the absence of statutory language or legislative his-
tory specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But such liability is pre-
mised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/5
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Birnbaum,155 the court contended that federal law only pros-
cribes "fraud perpetrated upon . . . purchasers or sellers of se-
curities .... "156 Based on this theory and the three notice ar-
guments, the district court dismissed the Rule 10b-5 portion of
the government's indictment.15
B. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals
1. Scope of Rule 10b-5
Initially, the majority opinion sought to undercut the dis-
trict court's conclusion about the scope of section 10(b) by
stressing the difference between private damage suits and gov-
ernment enforcement actions.15 8 Noting that section 10(b) was
enacted as a "regulatory and criminal piece of legislation,"" the
between parties to a transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading
guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the share-
holder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent
use of material, nonpublic information.
Id.
154. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 860. The portion of this opinion to
which the Newman court seems to be referring states:
Therefore it seems clear from the legislative purpose Congress expressed in
the Act, and the legislative history of Section 10(b) that Congress when it used the
phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" intended only
that the device employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort that would cause
reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying,
cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities.
Id. This quote was also a favorite of the defendant, Newman. See Brief for Defendant-
Appellee at 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, & 18, United States v. Newman,. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
155. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d at 463. The portion of the opinion
to which the court seems to be referring states:
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act only made it unlawful to defraud or deceive pur-
chasers of securities .... The SEC's press release . . . which announced the
Commission's adoption of Rule X-10B-5 shows that the Commission was attempt-
ing only to make the same prohibitions contained in Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
applicable to purchasers as well as sellers. That such was the only purpose of Rule
X-10B-5 is made abundantly clear when the language of the Rule is compared
with the language Section 17(a); the Commission simply copied Section 17(a) ad-
ding the words "any person" in place of "the purchaser" and a final clause "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
Id.
156. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at
91,296.
157. Id.
158. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16-17.
159. Id. at 16 (citing A.T. Bred & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1967)). In
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majority pointed out that only the government is expressly given
the power to sue under the statute, while the private remedy
was implied from the law by the courts. 60 According to the
court, the judiciary found it necessary to create the "purchaser-
seller" standing rule because its remedy did not have boundaries
like the statutory actions. 16 For these reasons, the majority con-
cluded that the district court's reading of a buyer-seller limita-
tion into Rule 10b-5 was an incorrect interpretation of the
law. 162
2. Newman's fraudulent conduct violates Rule 10b-5
Next, the court examined the nature of the defendant's
fraud. Borrowing from Chief Justice Burger's Chiarella dissent,
the majority found that the employees in this scheme "misap-
propriated - stole to put it bluntly - valuable nonpublic infor-
mation entrusted to [them] in the utmost confidence."" " This
theft, it argued, defrauded the employers (investment bankers)
of their reputation for confidentiality regarding their clients'
secrets and thus had the same effect as if the employees stole
money from them.'" The majority also contended that this theft
of information defrauded the clients because offerors generally
base their decision to make a bid on the current market price of
the target company.1a6 Relying on the passage from a treatise on
A. T. Brod, the Second circuit concluded that:
Neither § 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5, it appears, speaks in terms of limiting the
nature of the violation to one involving fraud of "investors"; nor is there any justi-
fication for reading such an additional requirement into the Act. Section 10(b) was
aimed at manipulative and deceptive devices which were employed "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security" and which contravened the rules and
regulations established by the Commission. These rules and regulations were to be
promulgated by the Commission "in the public interest or for the protection of
investors .... "Similarly, Rule 10b-5, which prohibited fraudulent schemes in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities was designed to protect both
investors and "the public interest."
Id. (emphasis in original).
160. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
161. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
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takeovers, 166 the court ruled that the defendant's subsequent
trading "artifically inflated" the price that the offerors had to
pay for the target. 6 '
After establishing that Newman's conduct was fraudulent,
the majority proceeded to show that this particular fraud was
sufficiently "in connection with" the defendant's securities
transactions so as to give rise to a violation of Rule 10b-5.'6a To
construe the connection clause, the court looked to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of that phrase in the Bankers Life case. 69
As noted earlier, Bankers Life concluded that section 10(b) must
be "flexibly" construed and that the required connection occurs
whenever fraud is "touching" upon a securities trade.'70 The
Newman majority pointed out that the Second Circuit had pre-
viously held that this "touching" requirement is met where there
is "a fraudulent scheme the accomplishment of which is directly
related to the trading process.' ' 7 1 Since the scheme Newman
166. See 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
AND MERGERS § 27.05[41 (1981) (an increase in trading of the target company's shares
will drive up its price causing the proposed takeover to become "less attractive" to the
offering company).
167. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17-18.
Some commentators argue that the price adjustments caused by insider and outsider
trading have a positive effect on the market because they allow stock prices to reflect
their true value. These proponents of what has been called the "Efficient Capital Mar-
ket Hypothesis" argue that regulation of insiders and outsiders stops the flow of infor-
mation necessary for an accurate pricing system and thus should be abolished. See, e.g.,
Fama, Random Walks In Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J., No. 5, 1965, at 55.
The SEC has never recognized the validity of these arguments. See, e.g., Remarks of
John M. Fedders, Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, Fall Meeting Of the
Association of General Counsel, Washington D.C., October 8, 1981, at 9-10. Other com-
mentators have also rejected the basis of this theory. See, e.g., J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON,
THE STOCK MARKET - THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 98-112 (1973).
168. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18.
169. Id. Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. at 12-13.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The Newman majority noted that this test
has been interpreted rather broadly. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18. See also
Mansbach v. Prescott Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1028 (6th Cir. 1979) which stated:
"[tIhis has been called a de minimis 'touch test' and few cases since Superintendent of
Insurance have been dismissed for failure to satisfy the "in connection with" require-
ment of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. (quoting Note, The Pendulum Swings Farther: The
"In Connection with" Requirement and Pretrial Dismissals of Rule 10b-5 Private
Claims for Damages, 56 TEx. L. REV. 62, 66 (1977)).
170. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
171. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18 (quoting Competitive Assoc., Inc. v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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participated in was pointless without his subsequent trading, the
court ruled that the necessary connection was present.
172
3. Fair notice
Throughout the majority opinion, the court also addressed
the issue of fair notice. For example, it recognized that a number
of years before this scheme began, various circuit courts had
adopted an exception to the "purchaser-seller" rule where the
plaintiff only sought injunctive relief.173 According to the major-
ity, these holdings highlighted the fact that the language of Rule
10b-5 does not contain any requirement that the fraud be
against a buyer or seller.17 4 Newman, thus, should have realized
"that in a criminal action the courts likewise would follow the
language of the Rule. 1
75
With regard to the fraudulent nature of the defendant's
conduct, the majority pointed to other areas of federal law where
a fiduciary's misappropriation of secrets entrusted to him was
held to be illegal.1 76 From this, the court reasoned that Newman
should not have believed that Congress intended any less sub-
stantial standard for fraud when it enacted the securities laws.1
The majority also noted that this scheme occurred within
one year of the Bankers Life decision. 178 Given the proximity of
this broad interpretation of the connection clause to Newman's
activity, the clear implication of the majority's statement was
that Newman should have recognized that his conduct fell
within the reach of Rule 10b-5.
In the last paragraph of its analysis of the securities fraud,
the majority made its major argument on the question of notice.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 17. See supra note 76.
174. Id. See also supra note 159.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 18. As examples of similar treatment, the Newman majority cited cases
under: the federal statute against embezzlement and theft of public money, property or
records, 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976), see United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 70-71 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979); and the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976), see United States v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 963 (1980); Abbott v. United States, 293 F.2d 310, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d 921, 926-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 669 (1940).
177. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18.
178. Id.
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The court contended that, when the purchaser-seller rule is put
in its proper perspective, 1 9 "Rule 10b-5's proscription of fraudu-
lent and deceptive practices upon any person in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security" by itself gave Newman fair
notice that his conduct was illegal. 80 To support this proposi-
tion, the majority cited United States v. Persky,'8' which held
that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are not unconstitutionally
vague but clearly warn that "conduct fraudulent even under the
most restrictive definition of common law fraud ... is pro-
scribed .... "182
C. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent refused to base Newman's conviction on a viola-
tion of section 10(b). 83 Citing Chiarella and Blue Chip as evi-
dence of a "trend" by the Supreme Court to limit the scope of
the statute to fraud against purchasers and sellers, the dissent
was not convinced that the deceitful conduct in this case satis-
fied the "in connection with" requirement.'
IV. Analysis of the District Court and Second Circuit
Majority Opinions
The primary factor that separates Newman from past cases
brought under Rule 10b-5 is that to reach the defendant's con-
duct the government shifted its focus from the fraud against
parties in the securities transaction to the fraud against the
source of the nonpublic information. Such an approach was nec-
essary because Chiarella requires some sort of trust relationship
before imposing a disclosure duty and it held that none exists
between outsiders and ordinary sellers in the market.8 6 The al-
ternative left open in Chiarella was to look instead at the fraud
179. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
180. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 19.
181. 520 F.2d at 288. See supra note 117.
182. Id.
183. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 20 (Dumbauld, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent did, however, agree to reverse the district court on its dismissal of the mail fraud
charge. Id.
184. Id.
185. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 235. See supra note 122 and accompany-
ing text.
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used by the outsider to obtain the nonpublic market information
that he later traded upon. By concentrating on a fraud not oc-
curring in the trading process, a number of issues are raised.
First, did Congress intend to limit the scope of section 10(b) to
only those frauds involved in a securities transaction or did it
intend a broader scope in protecting the integrity of the market?
Second, in light of recent Supreme Court cases restricting the
scope of Rule lOb-5, does an employee's misappropriation of
secrets entrusted to him come within those new boundaries?
Third, what is the minimal relationship required between the
fraud and the actual purchase or sale of securities to meet the
"in connection with" language of Rule 10b-5? Since Newman
was a criminal enforcement action, 86 the final issue raised by
this case is whether Newman's due process right to fair notice
was violated, i.e., whether Rule 10b-5 gave the defendant clear
warning that it is illegal for an outsider to trade on misappropri-
ated nonpublic market information.
A. Is the Scope of Rule 10b-5 Limited to Frauds Against Pur-
chasers and Sellers?
In Justice Stevens's concurrence to Chiarella,8 7 and in the
district court's opinion'88 and the dissent to the Second Circuit
in Newman,189 the theory was advanced that the "purchaser-
seller" rule not only applies to standing in private damage ac-
tions but also delimits the scope of section 10(b). Under this in-
terpretation of the law, the misappropriation theory, which fo-
cuses on the fraud outside the purchase-sale transaction, would
be foreclosed. Since the Supreme Court has held that outsiders
have no disclusure duty to an ordinary purchase or seller, 90
Rule 10b-5 would be unavailable as a means to control abusive
trading by outsiders.
186. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16. See supra note 12.
187. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). See supra
note 126 and accompanying text.
188. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,296. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
189. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 20 (Dumbauld, J., dissenting). See supra
notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
190. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 235. See supra note 122 and accompany-
ing text.
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To support its construction of the scope of Rule 10b-5, the
district court in Newman cited Birnbaum, which first imposed
the purchaser-seller standing rule on private damage actions
under the Rule, finding that section 10(b) was intended to reach
only those frauds occurring in transactions between buyers and
sellers.1" While the standing rule was subsequently accepted by
the courts," 2 this analysis of the statute's scope was not.'"
When the Supreme Court adopted the standing rule in Blue
Chip, its analysis was clearly centered on private damage ac-
tions.'" In justifying its conclusion, rather than relying upon
Birnbaum's analysis the Court focused on the fact that the se-
curities laws generally limit private causes of action to injured
buyers and sellers.'9 While the Court noted that Congress re-
jected a proposal to broaden the statute to include "attempts"
to buy or sell, it also recognized that this amendment was de-
feated out of "fears of the extension of civil liability.""'
Furthermore, the lengthy policy arguments used in Blue
Chip to support its adoption of the standing rule show that the
Court was principally concerned with controlling the problems
caused by the explosive growth of the private damage action and
not with restricting the scope of section 10(b). 1 7 To remedy this,
191. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RP. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,296. See supra notes 76-77, 156 and accompanying text.
192. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
193. As noted earlier, the Newman majority pointed out that a number of circuits
have recognized an exception to the standing rule when the plaintiff merely sought an
injunction. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. See supra note 76 and text accom-
panying note 173. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has at various times stated that the
standing rule does not apply to SEC injunctions and criminal prosecutions brought by
the Justice Department. See, e.g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 768, 774 n. 6
(1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 469 n. 9. See also A. BaoM-
BERG & L. LoWENFELS, supra note 4, § 4.7 (522), at 84.32 ("After Supt. of Insurance,
then, Birnbaum survives significantly only for the buyer-seller requirement, which has
been much reduced by other decisions"); A. JAcoss, supra note 4, § 38.01[d], at 2-48
("exceptions have been made in the strict application of the Birnbaum doctrine....
The Birnbaum doctrine was undoubtedly intended as a standing rule only for private
rights of action. The purchaser-seller requirement is inapplicable to criminal
actions ....").
194. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 727-49.
195. Id. at 735. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
196. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 732. See supra note 79.
197. For example, Blue Chip stressed that, when suits are brought by parties who
do not have the documentary proof of the purchase-sale transaction, the courts are faced
by dockets crowded with weak cases and vexatious litigation. Blue Chip Stamps v.
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the Court sought to restrict the potential class of private liti-
gants who could sue for damages."'8
Toward the end of its opinion, the Court in Blue Chip suc-
cinctly described what that case stood for when it stated, "[w]e
are dealing with a private cause of action which had judicially
been found to exist, and which will have to be judicially delim-
ited one way or another unless and until Congress addresses this
question."199
The majority in Newman cited this statement when it con-
cluded that the "purchaser-seller" restriction was imposed be-
cause the implied private right of action lacked the "contours"
which the remedies expressly included in the statute have. 00
This proposition seems logical and consistent with the reasoning
of Blue Chip.
Unlike private actions, which if unbounded by a standing
rule threaten to bury the courts with vexatious and hard to
prove cases, government enforcement efforts are constrained by
budgetary limitations. The courts have frequently recognized
that the SEC does not have the resources to adequately police
all violations of the securities laws. 01 Individuals, acting as pri-
vate attorneys-general discover and investigate more breaches of
this law than does government. 02 Despite the drive by the SEC
to stop this activity, the number of cases brought within the first
twenty-one months of this program only totaled twenty-six and
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 740-47. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
198. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 747. See supra note 84
and accompanying text.
199. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 747 (emphasis added).
200. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. See supra note 161 and accompany-
ing text.
201. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 324-25 n. 6 (6th Cir. 1976) (con-
curring opinion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 521 F.2d
225, 227 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 426 U.S. 944 (1976); Gulf & Western
Indus., Inc. v. The Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 1973).
202. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), accord Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 240 n.18.
Even today, with the SEC's current emphasis on insider trading under the Reagan
administration, budget constraints have led to criticism that too many resources are be-
ing devoted to this area. This has forced the Commission to cut out less important de-
fendants from its insider actions to save money. See SEC Faced With Tight Budget, Is
Paring 'Peripheral Defendants' From Complaints, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1982, at 6, col. 2.
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most of these were settled without trial by a consent order.03
This contrasts sharply with the flood of private actions Blue
Chip alluded to when it imposed the standing rule.o
Thus, as the Newman majority points out, the purchaser-
seller rule is merely a judicial management tool that the courts
found necessary when the remedy they created got out of con-
trol.2 05 This conclusion is underscored by Blue Chip, which ar-
gued that the purpose of the standing rule was to control the
policy problems presented by private damage actions by limiting
the class of potential plaintiffs.2"s Rather than evidencing a
trend toward limiting the scope of section 10(b), the adoption of
the standing rule in Blue Chip seems more consistent with the
current hostility of the Court toward implied private causes of
action in the securities laws. 07 For these reasons, the Newman
majority appears to be quite correct in concluding that the dis-
trict court's reading of a buyer-seller restriction into section
10(b) was an "overbroad and incorrect summary of the law." 08
203. No-Tip Policy: Insider Trading Drive Trips Bankers, Lawyers As Well As Ex-
ecutives, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
204. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
205. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. See supra text accompanying note
161.
206. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 747. See supra notes 80-
84 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-24
(1979) (no private right of action under section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976), but a limited implied right does exist under section 215,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976)); Touche Rosa & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-79 (1979)
(no private right of action under section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 779(a)
(1976)).
208. United States v. Newman, 644 F.2d at 17. See supra note 162 and accompany-
ing text.
At least one federal court has misinterpreted the relevance of this portion of the
Newman decision. In O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp.
1179, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a district court held that an options trader may sue for dam-
ages against both insiders and tippees of a corporation who purchased options without
disclosing their knowledge of an upcoming takeover. Even though the defendants had no
fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff, the court, citing Newman, granted standing to
sue on the basis of the insiders' duty to the investing public to either abstain or disclose,
derived from their fiduciary duty to the corporation. Id. at 1183-88. This application of
Newman disregards the clear distinction Newman drew between the limits the standing
rule places on private damages actions and the broader scope of section 10(b), which sets
the boundaries for government suits.
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B. Is This a Fraud Under Rule lOb-5?
i. Common law fraud
Under the principle of common law agency, Newman aided
his coconspirators in violating their fiduciary duty not to misuse
confidential information entrusted to them in the course of their
employment.2 09 This special relationship also gave rise to a dis-
closure duty under the common law of fraud, which these em-
ployees breached by failing to report their activities to their
employer.2 10
The common law also requires that the defrauded party be
injured.2 1 In this case, the employees clearly took something of
value from their employers. Since secrecy is a key element in a
successful tender offer,21 2 firms like the investment bankers in
this case take special precautions to prevent their employees
from disclosing any information about their clients' plans.21 3
Thus, as the Newman majority concluded, the damage caused
by these employees to their banking houses' reputations as safe
places for their clients' secrets "defrauded these employers as
surely as if they took their money."214
The majority also found that the offerors were also de-
frauded because Newman's trading "artificially inflated" the
market price of their target companies.21 5 While the court's con-
clusion that there was a fraud seems correct, the reason given to
support it is questionable. Arguably, pre-announcement trading
patterns can tip the market about upcoming takeover bids.2 1 6 It
is also true, however, that such trading can go unnoticed, partic-
ularly if it involves small transactions in an actively traded
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387, 395 & comments a and c (1954). See
supra note 123.
210. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
211. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 105, at 685-86.
212. See A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 4-6
(1978); Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership in Corporate Takeover Bids:
Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967) (testimony of Donald Calvin,
Vice-President of the New York Stock Exchange).
213. See supra note 203, at 24.
214. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
215. Id. at 17-18. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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stock, and will thus have no noticeable effect on the target's
price.217 The majority's reliance on a fraud against the offerors
in their role as future investors is thus problematic because it
requires the difficult job of proving that the target's price actu-
ally did go up due to the defendant's trading.2 18
A better approach would have been to recognize that the
employees were subagents of the clients.2 1 In this capacity, they
had the same relationship of trust and confidence with the offer-
ors as they did with their employers, 220 and therefore owed them
the same disclosure duty.2 2' Through this analysis, the employ-
ees' fraud can be based on a clear breach of duties owed because
of their employment relationship, rather than gambling on
whether the offerors actually suffered a loss in their tender offer.
ii. Fraud under Rule 10b-5
Even though Newman's scheme presents a clear case of
common law fraud, it is still necessary to see whether it fits
within recent Supreme Court pronouncements concerning what
constitutes fraud under Rule 10b-5. For example, in Chiarella,
the Court held that nondisclosure does not become fraud under
section 10(b) unless there is a special relationship creating a
duty to speak.222 As noted above, the employees in this case had
such an obligation to both their employers and the offerors.22 3
In Santa Fe, however, the Court also warned that a simple
217. Stock prices on the major exchanges are usually set by specialists who make
their living dealing in particular stocks. Unless a stock is thinly traded, it will generally
take a significant transaction to get the specialist to alter his price. See generally 2 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1201-08 (2d ed. 1961).
218. See Wang, Trading On Material Nonpublic Information On Impersonal Stock
Markets: Who Is Harmed, And Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1236-38 (1981).
219. Since the investment bankers, who had a fiduciary duty to use the confidential
information entrusted to them only for the purposes of aiding clients in their takeovers,
acted under the control and for the benefit of those offering companies, they assumed an
agency relationship with their clients. See RESTATEMENr (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 14N
(1958). The employees who were agents of their employers, became sub-agents of the
clients. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 5 & comment c (1958).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 428 & comments a & b (1958).
221. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
222. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 227-28. See supra note 124 and accom-
panying text.
223. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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breach of fiduciary duty does not violate Rule 10b-5 without
manipulative or deceptive conduct.22 4 It stressed that it did not
want to turn ordinary corporate mismanagement into a violation
of the securities laws.22 5 Furthermore, in Hochfelder, the Court
held that in order to commit fraud under the Rule, a defendant
must have "scienter," which it defined as an "intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud. 22 6
The conduct in Newman easily meets the requirements of
Santa Fe and Hochfelder. In this scheme, the employees,
secretly and without permission, took confidential information
entrusted to them. 7 The deliberate deceitfulness of this enter-
prise is evidenced by the elaborqte measures taken to avoid de-
tection, such as using multiple brokers and foreign bank
accounts.2
It would thus appear that Newman's conduct is of the kind
considered to be fraudulent under Rule 10b-5. As the majority
in Newman pointed out, this "was not simply corporate
mismanagement. '2 9
C. Was this Particular Fraud Sufficiently "in Connection
With" a Securities Transaction?
Since the fraud in this case did not occur within the defen-
dant's purchases or sales, the Newman majority had to establish
that it had the requisite connection to those transactions so as
to come within the scope of Rule 10b-5. To do this, the majority
relied on the Supreme Court's liberal construction of the con-
nection clause in Bankers Life. 5 0 In that case, the Court ruled
that this clause should be construed "flexibly" to reach frauds
"touching" the sale of securities.2 3 1 Taken to the extreme, one
224. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 473-74. See supra text accompany-
ing note 90.
225. Id. at 478-80. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
226. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193. See supra notes 85-86 and ac-
companying text.
227. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 17.
230. See supra notes 62-65, 169 and accompanying text.
231. Id.
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could use this test to create securities fraud out of conduct with
extremely tenuous connections to a securities transaction. As
noted earlier, however, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe made it
clear that Rule 10b-5 does not cover all breaches of fiduciary
conduct that happen to have some connection with the purchase
or sale of securities. 23
2
The Newman majority avoided such broad liability by refer-
ring to a prior Second Circuit case which held that the "touch-
ing" test is met where the very purpose of the fraud is to put
someone in position to buy and sell securities.2 " Looking at the
facts of this case, the majority stressed that the defendant par-
ticipated in his coconspirators misappropriation for only one
reason - to enable him to buy and sell the stock of the target
companies at a profit.23 4
By focusing on the purpose of the fraud, the majority con-
strued the "touching" test so that it does not reach ordinary em-
ployee misconduct, but only those situations where the primary
reason for committing the fraud is to enable one to buy or sell
securities. In this way, section 10(b) can control outsider abuse
of market information that threatens the integrity of the
financial markets, 35 while maintaining a clear division between
securities fraud and ordinary corporate mismangement.
36
D. Did Newman Have "Fair Notice" That His Conduct Vio-
lated Rule 10b-5?
Criminal enforcement of Rule 10b-5 imposes on the govern-
ment the additional burden of proving that the Rule gave the
defendant a "clear and definite statement" that his activity was
illegal. 3 7 In Newman, the district court and the Second Circuit
232. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 473-74. See supra note 90 and ac-
companying text.
233. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18 (quoting Competitive Assoc., Inc. v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975)). See supra
note 171 and accompanying text.
234. Id. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
237. United States v. Persky, 588 F.2d at 288. See supra note 117 and accompany-
ing text.
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majority came to opposite results on this issue.38 In analyzing
this question, it is necessary to compare the respective argu-
ments of the two courts and then apply the relevant principles
of "fair notice" developed by the Supreme Court.
In examining the competing arguments, two of the district
court's reasons can be immediately dismissed. First, the lower
court contended that "warehousing," where an offeror intention-
ally leaks its takeover plans to certain institutional investors, is
similar to outsider trading on misappropriated market informa-
tion, because both involve transactions based on nonpublic facts
about the target company by persons unrelated to it.2 39 Since
the SEC refused to apply Rule 10b-5 to this practice, the district
court concluded that Newman should have assumed that the
same treatment would be given to his conduct.240
This analysis ignores critical differences between "ware-
housing" and the misappropriation of confidential takeover in-
formation by an employee entrusted with such secrets. In "ware-
housing," the offeror voluntarily reveals its secret plans. In
Newman's case, however, the information was stolen, despite the
offerors intention to keep it confidential. Thus, any notice the
defendant received from the SEC's treatment of "warehousing"
was irrelevant in the context of the fraud charged here.
The district court's conclusion also relied on the lack of ref-
erences to Rule 10b-5 when Rule 14e-3 was being considered as a
means to expressly control conduct like Newman's.241 Yet, the
lower court also found no significance in government actions
during this same time period against outsiders trading on non-
public market information, because they resulted in consent de-
crees and guilty pleas and had little value as precedent on which
one could rely for notice. 2
Placing more weight on one of these forms of government
conduct than on the other makes little sense under the district
238. Compare United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,024, at 91,296 with United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 19. See supra
notes 140 and 180 and accompanying text.
239. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,292-93. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
240. Id. at 91,293. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
241. Id. at 91,294. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
242. Id. at 92,294-95. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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court's own logic. Unlike the Congressional debate and hearings
that shed light on the intended purposes of section 10(b), com-
ment during administrative rulemaking under another section of
the law, section 14(e), seems to have as much precedential value
as the guilty pleas and consent decrees that the court dis-
counted.
The district court's remaining argument stressed that no
case had ever expressly held that Rule 10b-5 prohibited trading
by outsiders on market information.2 43 According to the court,
this indicated that the securities laws were only intended to
reach fraud against purchasers or sellers.2 44 In contrast, the Sec-
ond Circuit majority held that since the case law does not limit
Rule 10b-5 to fraud against buyers or sellers, the broad language
of the Rule gave Newman sufficient notice that his conduct was
illegal..45 Since this note has resolved the debate over the pur-
chaser-seller rule in favor of the Second Circuit majority,24" the
notice issue in this case boils down to whether due process re-
quires that either the statute or a prior case expressly warn
Newman that his conduct was prohibited, or does the more gen-
eral warning found in the language of the Rule suffice? 247
Looking at the facts in this case, Newman was a profes-
sional securities trader, who managed a department at a New
York brokerage firm.2 48 The courts have recognized that profes-
sionals in the securities industry, unlike ordinary laymen, are re-
sponsible for knowing the laws that regulate their profession.2"
243. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RFs. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,295. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
244. Id. at 91,296.
245. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 19. See supra notes 179-80 and accom-
panying text.
246. See supra notes 192-218 and accompanying text.
247. In analyzing these alternatives it should be stressed that the notice doctrine
has principally developed in a first amendment context to draw a clear line between
protected speech and criminal activity. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188
(1977); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). The Supreme Court has ruled
that notice challenges based on grounds other than the first amendment "must be ex-
amined in light of the facts of the case at hand." United States v. Mazurei, 419 U.S. 544,
550 (1975). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 573 (1974).
248. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15.
249. United States v. Persky, 588 F.2d at 28 n. 8; SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301,
1308 (2d Cir. 1974).
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It is thus reasonable to expect that Newman could determine
the scope of Rule 10b-5 by analyzing the law in a manner similar
to the Second Circuit majority, rather than needing one case to
expressly spell it out for him.
The fact that scienter is necessary to prove a Rule 10b-5
violation also supports this position.250 The Supreme Court has
ruled "that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vague-
ness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the
complainant that his conduct is proscribed." '' As noted earlier,
Newman had the requisite mental intent.25
In summary, since Newman was a professional, who was
presumably familiar with the law surrounding Rule 10b-5, and
since the scienter required to establish his liability mitigated the
degree of explicitness necessary to give him fair notice, the fact
that neither the statute nor case law expressly proscribe his con-
duct should not undermine the court's finding of sufficient no-
tice. Rather, the cases holding that the purchaser-seller rule
does not limit the scope of the statute, together with the com-
mission of a common law fraud intended solely to put the defen-
dant in a position to profitably buy and sell securities, support
the contention that the broad warning of Rule 10b-5 provided
Newman with sufficient notice that his actions were illegal.
V. Conclusion
In Newman, the Second Circuit clarified a serious misun-
derstanding about the impact of Blue Chip on the scope of sec-
tion 10(b). The majority pointed out that the purchaser-seller
rule was merely a response by the courts to the threat of being
overwhelmed by hard-to-prove and vexatious litigation. It did
not in any way limit the scope of this law whose very language
evinces a clear intent to broadly deal with fraud connected to a
securities transaction.
By focusing on the fraud against the employers and the of-
ferors, the majority succeeded in satisfying Chiarella's require-
250. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193. See supra notes 85-86 and ac-
companying text.
251. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193
(1982).
252. See supra notes 11, 227 and accompanying text.
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ment that there be some duty to speak before liability arises
under Rule 10b-5. Punishing such flagrant breaches of trust and
confidence is consistent with the original purposes of the securi-
ties laws.
The majority's interpretation of the connection clause to re-
quire that the sole purpose of the fraud be a later securities
transaction kept the broad "touching" test of Bankers Life from
being extended too far. Under the majority's theory, Rule 10b-5
is able to reach outsider trading without making ordinary corpo-
rate mismanagement a securities law violation.
Finally, the difficulty over notice in this case points to the
problem the government faces when it uses a new theory of lia-
bility in a criminal case. As the Newman majority held, however,
when the purchaser-seller limitation is put in its proper perspec-
tive, Rule 10b-5's broad prohibition against fraud connected to
the purchase or sale of securities would give a market profes-
sional like Newman sufficient notice that his conduct was illegal.
James M. Robertson
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